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Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American 
Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era 
by 
Briggs Evans 
The evolution of United States military doctrine was heavily influenced by the Wehrmacht and 
their early Blitzkrieg campaigns during World War II.  This thesis traces the origins of this 
development and shows how the context of the Cold War led to a heavy influence by the 
Wehrmacht on American military doctrine.  By analyzing studies conducted by the United States 
Army Historical Division from 1946-1961, I will show how these studies left a profound impact 
on American Military doctrine, particularly in the context of the Cold War. I will show the 
development of the Active Defense Doctrine and AirLand Battle during the 1970s and 1980s 
were largely influenced by lessons learned from the Wehrmacht.  By comparing these doctrines 
with the Wehrmacht's Truppenführung, the influence is undeniable.  Finally, I will show how the 
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 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY   
The Coming Storm: Blitzkrieg Origins and Myths 
On May 10th, 1940, Nazi Germany and the Wehrmacht shocked the world with a rapid 
aggressive military operation into the Republic of France.  After a successful breakthrough at 
Sedan, German forces subdued the French Military and conquered France in just six and a half 
weeks, an achievement that was unobtainable over the course of four years from 1914-1918 
during the First World War.1 Using innovative motorized infantry tactics supported by close 
coordination with Luftwaffe air power, the Wehrmacht executed Fall Gelb, Case Yellow, with a 
blend of experience, intuition, and understanding, that success even surprised its German 
planners.2   This new style of modern warfare became known as Blitzkrieg or “lighting war” and 
the Wehrmacht's innovative strategy definitively set the tone for the rest of the war.  The German 
ability to achieve strategic results so efficiently and effectively with minimal casualties caught 
the attention of militaries around the world and arguably changed the conduct of warfare forever.   
  The purpose of this project is to analyze how Blitzkrieg doctrine has influenced modern 
warfare, particularly in the United States. As this issue is hotly debated among historians and 
military minds alike, I will also explore the historiographical discussions pertaining to Blitzkrieg 
and its complexities.  Some historians, such as Karl-Heinz Frieser and Robert Citino, have even 
demonstrated that there was no official Blitzkrieg doctrine at all, as there is no example of the 
term throughout interwar Wehrmacht doctrine.  This paper will explore the historiographical 
controversies of the word but will refer back to the term for the sake of simplicity and structure.  
Ultimately, I intend to show that American military planners were drawn to the success of the 
                                                          
1 Lloyd Clark, Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality, and Hitler’s Lighting War, France, 1940 (New York: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 2016), 25-27. 
2 Ibid., 483-486. 
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German new style of warfare and in many ways tried to emulate its principles throughout the 
twentieth century.  Though the United States invested time and effort into learning from 
Blitzkrieg, they did not successfully execute its principles until the first Gulf War in 1991.     
 In the first chapter of this project, I will explore the origins and development of the 
Blitzkrieg doctrine leading up to World War Two, as well as the historiographical debates 
regarding its initial success.  While some military historians argue that Blitzkrieg had little 
success and France was merely a stroke of luck, others have attributed the victory to superior 
operational planning.3  I will discuss the controversy of the term itself and how different 
historians have wrestled with its meaning.  The first chapter will also establish that Blitzkrieg 
doctrine and its shocking success attracted Allied military leaders, and subsequently defined 
military operations for the rest of the war.  I will argue that the Wehrmacht's ability to revisit 
traditional German military principles and integrate them with modern technology led to the 
initial success of lighting war in first three years of the war.   Though the United States and other 
Allied powers ultimately achieved victory, they were never able to achieve the swift victories 
that emulated Germany’s invasion of France in 1940.4   
The next chapter will examine the influence of Blitzkrieg doctrine on American military 
doctrine during the postwar years.  As ideological tensions developed between the United States 
and Soviet Union almost immediately following the defeat of Nazi Germany, another large-scale 
modern war seemed almost certain.  Seeking to learn from the success and failures of the 
German struggle on the Eastern Front, the United States sought to examine any information that 
                                                          
3 Ibid., 477. 
4 Robert Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare (Lawrence: University 




could give them the edge against the Soviets.  From 1945 to 1961, the United States Army 
Historical Division interviewed and reviewed reports of German officers to write a history of the 
war on the Eastern Front.  As the relations between the United States and Soviet Union 
deteriorated, these interviews and reports became crucial to war planning for a future conflict.5  
In this chapter I will show the United States military’s desire to learn from the Germans by 
examining a collection of two hundred and thirteen of these reports.  I will also examine studies 
from American military institutions and how they contributed to the American militaries 
understanding of Blitzkrieg doctrine.  Finally, this chapter will compare and contrast the official 
German military doctrine of the Second World War, Die Truppenführung, and the development 
of the United States doctrine of “Airland Battle.” 
The final chapter will examine what the American lessons derived from Blitzkrieg looked 
like in actual practice.  By examining the events of the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq, I will 
demonstrate how the United States was able to achieve what was considered a successful modern 
Blitzkrieg. I will show similarities of the Gulf War and the 1940 invasion of France.  Military 
historians such as Robert Citino have cited the development of the Airland Battle doctrine as 
direct evidence of Blitzkrieg’s influence on American military doctrine.6  Developed in the 
1980s, Airland Battle doctrine laid out the principles for how the United States was to conduct 
warfare.  At the core of this doctrine, the most important concepts include initiative, depth, 
agility, and synchronization.7  This chapter will emphasize how the United States carried out 
these principles in its brief successful war with Iraq.  It will also support my argument that 
                                                          
5 Robert W. Hutchinson, “The Weight of History: Wehrmacht Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division, 
and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945-1946, “ Journal of Military History 4 (October 2014): 1321. 
6 Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 9. 




though the United States had a longstanding desire to emulate Blitzkrieg, it was not successful in 
doing so until 1991.   
Before diving into the historiographical discussions about the origins and development of 
Blitzkrieg, I believe it is important to understand how historians have defined military doctrine 
and its functions. Geoffrey Sloan’s article “Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy, and the 
Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis and Theory” examines the controversy surrounding the 
definition.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization defines doctrine as “the fundamental 
principles by which military forces guide their actions of objectives.”8  In a literal definition the 
word doctrine means “what is taught” as it comes from the Latin word doctrine. Sloan’s own 
definition describes doctrine as bridge between thought and action or in other terms how military 
doctrine articulates war.9 There are many  different contributing factors into how doctrine 
functions, and ideally it must remain universally cohesive from top to bottom in a fighting force. 
In 1997, Professor John Gooch identified six components that include: the nature of weapons and 
technology, the influence of formative experiences, organizational and institutional interests, 
ideology, culture, and political and strategic situations.10 Sloan further builds off this, evaluating 
the need for doctrine to perform on multiple levels of warfare including strategic, operational and 
tactical levels of war.11    
Robert Citino further builds off the functions of doctrine in his book Blitzkrieg to Desert 
Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare.  Citino asserts that military doctrine is essential to 
                                                          
8 Geoffrey Sloan, “Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis 
and Theory,” International Affairs, 88, no. 2 (2012): 243. 
9 Ibid., 243-244. 
10 Ibid., 251. 
11 Ibid., p.244. 
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warfare as it fundamentally defines the objectives of an operation.12  Without a clear objective in 
mind, military commanders are essentially crashing into the enemy and hoping for the best.  
Elliot Cohen ‘s chapter “War Planning” from the Cambridge History of WW2 also emphasizes 
the importance of operational planning.  Cohen identifies two key aspects in the development of 
military doctrine.  The first is addressing the requirements of the operation and preparing for its 
initial phases.  The next step is interwar planning and how to adjust to new circumstances or 
obstacles that may hinder the campaign’s goals.13  In other words, as the landscape of war is 
rapidly changing, military commanders must be flexible in order to adjust and adapt to ensure 
success.  As we will see this concept of flexibility among military commanders is a key tenet of 
Blitzkrieg doctrine, and arguably is one of the key qualities that ensured its success. 
While historians and military thinkers have reached somewhat of a consensus regarding 
doctrine and its functions, Blitzkrieg is the flip side of the coin.  The historiographical debates 
regarding Blitzkrieg are as fiercely contested as any topic.  The most prevalent themes, however, 
seem to pertain to three topics: Blitzkrieg’s origins, its myths, and its impact on modern warfare.  
The origins debate focuses on the first evidence of the mobile style of warfare being 
implemented.  While many have focused on the final phase of World War One, historians such 
as Douglas Fermer and Robert Citino point to the nineteenth century conflicts of German 
unification in 1866 and the invasion of France in 1870.14  The debate over the myths of 
Blitzkrieg also is a point of contention worth exploring.  Some historians have asserted that there 
                                                          
12 Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 8. 
13 Elliot Cohen, “War Planning,” in The Cambridge History of the Second World War, ed. John Ferris and 
Evan Mawdsley, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 533. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/cho9781139855969.023. Accessed February 21, 2021. 
14 Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 20-21; Douglas Fermer, Three German Invasions of France: the 
Summer Campaigns of 1870, 1914 and 1940 (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2013), x-xii. 
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was in fact no Blitzkrieg doctrine at all, citing the absence of the word in any official Wehrmacht 
doctrine.15  German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser contends that the 1940 Blitzkrieg was 
in no way an indication of the preplanned Blitzkrieg that Hitler is credited with.  Rather, factors 
like the changing nature of war, allied mistakes, and unauthorized German officer actions 
combined for a formula for success.16  Whether or not there was a definitive example of what 
Blitzkrieg and its success were, historians have debated its impact on modern warfare.  As we 
will see, works such as Robert Citino’s Blitzkrieg to Airland Battle, and a recent master‘s thesis 
by James Curry have examined the direct impact that Blitzkrieg had on American military 
doctrine.17           
Historians have perhaps traced the origins of Blitzkrieg to the success of German 
operational thinking and doctrine during the nineteenth century.  Gerhard Gross’s article, 
“Development of Operational Thinking in the German Army in the World War Era,” cites 
Germany’s unique geographic position as a crucial aspect of this development.  Due to 
Germany’s central geographic position and its borders surrounded by potential enemies, German 
military commanders such as Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke advocated for a highly trained 
aggressive fighting force.  The function of this force was to quickly seize the initiative by 
carrying the fight to the enemy in Germany’s border regions and deliver a knockout blow to the 
                                                          
15 George Raudzens “Blitzkrieg Ambiguities: Doubtful Usage of a Famous Word.” War & Society 7, no. 2 
(1989): 77–94. https://doi.org/10.1179/106980489790305551. 
16 Karl- Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 German Campaign in the West  (Annapolis, 
Maryland: US Naval Institute Press, 2013) 30-36. 
17 Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 9; James Curry “From Blitzkrieg to Airland Battle: The United States 
Army, the Wehrmacht, and the German Origins of Modern American Military Doctrine” (M.A. Thesis: University 
of Western Australia, 2015), 1-2. 
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enemy via maneuverability and mass of force at decisive points.18 This force also required its 
commanders to exercise flexibility and independence in its actions, because as Moltke put it “no 
plan survives contact with the enemy.”19  Douglas Fermer’s comparative study, Three German 
Invasions of France: The Summer campaigns of 1870, 1914, 1940 offers one striking nineteenth 
century example of Germany ‘s superior operational thinking. During the 1870 Prussian invasion 
of France, Prussian forces under Moltke displayed superior planning and execution versus the 
disorganized French troops.  Crucially, at Sedan during early September of 1870, Prussian forces 
trapped the French soldiers in a series of pincer movements that resulted in the capture of almost 
100,000 men.20  Moltke and the Prussian forces had achieved a decisive knockout blow with 
minimal loss of life and effectively ended the French Empire.21            
If the Prussian victory over France in 1870 marked early traces of Blitzkrieg doctrine 
success, technological advancements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century indicated 
setbacks.  During this time period, military campaigns were becoming larger, bloodier, and 
costlier than ever before.  However, campaigns were frequently following a pattern of initial 
success of offensives that eventually became bogged down into grinding contests of attrition.22  
Essentially, armies were failing to achieve knockout blows that could effectively end campaigns.  
Historians have cited the development of technology as a primary factor for this phenomenon, 
and in some ways, it seems as if technology had surpassed humans' conceptions of warfare.  
During the First World War, new weapons such as breech loading rifles, machine guns, and 
                                                          
18 Gerhard Gross, “Development of Operational Thinking in the German Army in the World War Era,” 
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 13, no. 4 (Summer 2011): 2. 
19 Robert Citino, “Beyond Fire and Movement: Command, Control and Information in the German 
Blitzkrieg 1,” in Journal of Strategic Studies, 27, no. 2 (June 2004): 333. 
20 Fermer, Three German Invasions, 57. 
21 Ibid., 66-67. 
22 Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm,” 14. 
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rapid-fire artillery made traditional notions of mobile warfare obsolete.  The growing size of 
massive military forces also created problems for German military command, as they found it 
increasingly difficult to control armies effectively.  According to Citino, the development of 
static trench warfare led back to the most important military issue, how to achieve operational 
mobility.23 
While Citino asserts that World War One and new technology was perhaps a setback for 
the development of Blitzkrieg doctrine, others have emphasized the war’s role in its 
development.  Williamson Murray contends that throughout the war the Germans proved 
themselves more imaginative and adaptive than the Allies in regard to tactical and operational 
conditions.  He cites Generals Erich Ludendorff’s abandonment of attrition warfare in the West 
in favor of a concentrated blow to the Russians in the East.  The Germans on the Western front 
also retreated from their initial frontlines to more favorable defensive positions from which they 
could counterattack the Allies.  Though the Germans did achieve victories during the final two 
years of the war, they did not translate into a decisive strategic victory.24   The seemingly 
fruitless carnage of the First World War signaled a need for military powers to rethink their 
approaches to warfare.  New developments in technology such as tanks and aircraft, the massive 
size of armies and campaigns, and the emergence of industrialized warfare based on economic 
resources redefined how victory was obtainable.  In the years following, military superpowers 
faced the task of revamping their fighting forces.25 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 14-18. 
24 Williamson Murray “German Army Doctrine, 1918-1939, and the Post-1945 Theory of ‘Blitzkrieg 
Strategy,” in Carole Fink, Isabel V. Hull, and MacGregor Knox, eds., German Nationalism and the European 
Response, 1890-1945 (Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 72-73.  
25 Cohen, “War Planning,” 535-537. 
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An important concept to understand during this time period is the relationship between 
doctrine and command philosophy.  Command philosophy is the process in which militaries 
establish hierarchy, discipline, authority, and individual responsibility.26  Geoffrey Sloan 
identifies the two major variants of command philosophy being centralized and decentralized.  
Both these concepts are derived from German concepts Befehlstaktik, orders-based tactics, and 
Auftragstaktik, mission-based tactics.  Orders-based tactics is considered a more restrictive 
approach as it informs the command chain why, when, and critically, how operations will be 
carried out.  On the other hand, mission-based tactics inform command chains how and when 
operations will be carried out but leave the how to the initiative of the officers.  The first inter-
war commander of German forces, General Hans von Seeckt, largely instilled mission-based 
tactics while also encouraging German commanders to examine how situations were handled 
during previous wars. Seeckt also promoted creativity among German officers by encouraging 
them to study the situations they faced in the war and how effectively they responded.  He then 
encouraged the officers to think of solutions to new problems that had yet been solved.  Sloan 
describes Seeckt as a sort of father of mobile warfare, as he sought to create a small, but well 
trained and equipped mobilized fighting force that was capable of quick maneuvers and making 
decisions to lead to the fast annihilation of enemy forces.27 
     Principles laid out by von Seeckt’s leadership were eventually consolidated into an 
official written doctrine called Die Truppenführung in the 1930s.  While some historians such as 
Shimon Naveh contend there in no coherent theory behind Germany’s operational thinking,28 
Truppenführung appears to embody qualities that are associated with Blitzkrieg.  The first major 
                                                          
26 Sloan, “Doctrine,” 246. 
27 Ibid., 246-247. 
28 Gross, “Development of Operational Thinking,” 1. 
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points describe war as an artform, “depending upon free, creative activity, that is scientifically 
grounded.”29  Truppenführung is vastly comprehensive with well over three hundred points of 
how officers of the Wehrmacht are to conduct war.  Some of the main themes advocated are 
instinctive and decisive leadership, outflanking the enemy with mobility and speed, enveloping 
enemy forces, and implementing combined arms in cohesion with offensive maneuvers.30   
Interestingly enough, the phrase Blitzkrieg is not even present within Truppenführung  and 
various historians contend that there was no groundbreaking innovation with the doctrine.  
Rather, Truppenführung was a return to classic German operational thinking of Bewegungskrieg, 
or war of movement.  This war of movement style was embraced throughout European history 
by commanders such as Fredrick the Great, Napoleon, and Moltke.  To the interwar leaders of 
the Wehrmacht, the return to the war of movement would solve the challenges of attrition 
warfare and once again lead to decisive victories.31 
Another important aspect of the development of Blitzkrieg and debates regarding its 
initial success, is the integration of technology and the development of Combined Arms Theory.  
Dennis Showalter’s article “Armies, Navies, Air Forces: The Instruments of War,” examines the 
military developments of the Allied and Axis powers between the World Wars.  The fruitless 
outcomes of campaigns during the First World War along with the development of new 
technology, such as the tank and airplane, left a pressing need for militaries to rethink how they 
fought.  While the First World War represented a war of mass, the second represented a mass of 
machines.  Showalter asserts that Germany, perhaps on accident, developed the best answer to 
                                                          
29 “Truppenführung,” Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library | US Army Combined Arms Center, 1. 
Accessed March 22, 2021. https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/carl/.   
30 Ibid., 7, 57, 61. 
31 Citino, “Beyond Fire and Movement,” 331.   
17 
 
this problem during the interwar period, creating what we know as Combined Arms Theory.32 
Combined Arms Theory essentially draws from the lessons of the First World War by integrating 
technological advancements such as the plane and tank and applying them to traditional German 
fighting methods of mobility and mass of force at the point of contention. 
The three technologies that morphed together to make Combined Arms Theory possible, 
were the tank, the airplane, and the radio.  Williamson Murray’s article, “German Army 
Doctrine, 1918-1939,” emphasizes the role that tank commanders such as Heinz Guderian and 
Oswald Lutz had in this development.  Guderian believed that tanks were crucial to achieve 
breakthroughs at points of contention and advocated for the development of a separate tank 
force.  Under General Oswald Lutz, the Wehrmacht created tank units into independent fighting 
forces that eventually developed into entire panzer armies.  The role of these independent units 
was to concentrate firepower rabidly, deliver sudden blows, and exploits breaches along the 
enemy's front.33 The Luftwaffe Army Support Doctrine was another key element of technology 
integration by the Germans.  James Corum‘s article, “The Luftwaffe‘s Army Support Doctrine, 
1918-1941,” emphasizes the role that airplanes had in Combined Arms Theory.  This Army 
Support Doctrine called for a spirit of cooperation between the Luftwaffe and ground forces and 
required pilots to be familiar with the operations of the Wehrmacht rather than act as a separate 
entity. The development of the Stuka dive-bomber was another example of the German emphasis 
of Combined Arms Theory. Corum cites the successful coordination of the Luftwaffe’s Stuka 
                                                          
32 Dennis Showalter, “Armies, Navies, Air Forces,” in The Cambridge History of the Second World War, 
ed. John Ferris and Evan Mawdsley, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 556–584. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/cho9781139855969.024.  
33 Murray, “German Army Doctrine,” 75-83. 
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dive-bombers during the Polish, French, and Barbarossa campaigns where the Luftwaffe struck 
in mass to deliver decisive blows to Allied air forces still on the ground.34   
The final technological aspect that tied armor and airpower together and allowed 
cooperation was radio and communication.  The only way for the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht to 
act in cohesion across the levels of war, is via direct communication.  Robert Citino contends 
that the Wehrmacht's integration of radio was the real breakthrough in interwar doctrine.  He 
argues that the German army was the first to realize that the radio was indispensable, as it solved 
the problem of operational indecisiveness by providing a direct line of communication between 
commanders and frontline forces.35  While the Luftwaffe was not able to develop radios that 
directly communicated with ground forces, they did use panels, smoke, flares and lights to 
coordinate targets.  During the French campaign of 1940, Luftwaffe leaders attached officers to 
armored command posts who could receive information reports from the frontlines.  These 
situation reports then were relayed to Air Corps command posts who could transform the 
information into attack orders within minutes.36 
The development of combined arms theory along with return to nineteenth century 
German military thinking of mobile warfare perhaps indicates the origins of Blitzkriegs success.  
Historians, however, have wrestled with the myths regarding its initial success.  Karl-Heinz 
Frieser’s book, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, argues that there was no 
predetermined doctrine to led to victory in France during the 1940 campaign.  Instead, the Blitz 
was an all or nothing improvised gamble that was born out of necessity.  After its initial success 
                                                          
34 James Corum, “The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941,” Journal of Military History, 59,      
no. l (Jan 1995): 56. 
35 Citino, “Blitzkrieg to Airland Battle,“ 27 
36 Corum, “Luftwaffe“P. 69-70 
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in France, the euphoria of victory convinced Hitler and German military leaders they had found a 
war winning strategy. When this plan was replicated again during Operation Barbarossa, its 
initial success eventually stalled out and the Germans were never able to take back the 
initiative.37  Other historians have also debunked the myth that the Wehrmacht was an elite 
motorized fighting force.  Richard Overy’s chapter “A War of Engines” in his book Why the 
Allies Won also argues that Wehrmacht forces were not qualitatively and quantitatively superior 
to their opponents. While the Wehrmacht was considered one of the most modern armies in the 
world, they were not the invincible mobile force that many have come to perceive. Overy argues 
that in many cases, the Germans were under armed throughout the war, as modernization was 
only focused on a small portion of the army and a great portion of the ground forces still relied 
on horseback.38 
The myth of a highly mechanized German fighting force and the predetermined doctrine 
of Blitzkrieg leaves one to ask: Where did this misconception come from?  Karl-Heinz Frieser 
argues that in part it was Western Allies own misconceptions that forged the myth.39  Another 
Frieser article, “The War in the West, 1939-1940,” notes that the legend was created after the 
war's conclusion by historians who molded a fictional story of the Blitzkrieg strategy.40 Historian 
Roger Beaumont is also critical of Blitzkrieg's success.  In an article published in the July 1986 
edition of Military Review, Beaumont contends that the Wehrmacht only defeated second class 
armies and was not as proficient as scholars and military thinkers were giving them credit for.41  
                                                          
37 Frieser, Blitzkrieg Legend, 412. 
38 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Random House, 2006), 210. 
39 Frieser, Blitzkrieg Legend, 563. 
40 Karl-Heinz Frieser, “The War in the West, 1939-1940,” in The Cambridge History of the Second World 
War, ed. John Ferris and Evan Mawdsley, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 287-288.   
41 Roger Beaumont, “On the Wehrmacht Mystique,” Military Review, 66 (July 1986): 45-56.  
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Other historians have pushed back on arguments like Beaumont's, often citing the success of the 
1940 French campaign. Historian Lloyd Clark’s analysis of the invasion of France, Blitzkrieg: 
Myth, Reality, and Hitler‘s Lightning War, examines how the fall of France was not a 
predetermined outcome due to superior qualitative and quantitative German forces.42  Clark 
argues that it was rather the French inability to grasp modern mobile concepts of war that led to 
disaster, as they heavily invested in fighting of a war of attrition by building up the Maginot 
Line.  Clark also cites the German ability to determine the French military’s weaknesses and 
exploit them.43   
In conclusion, this chapter sums up origins of Blitzkrieg and the historiographical 
arguments about its initial success. Regardless of the criticisms of historians such as Frieser and 
Beaumont of Blitzkrieg doctrine, it is undeniable that the 1940 French campaign and the initial 
victories of the Germans integrated traditional German fighting methods with technological 
advancements.  While this was not a written predetermined strategy, the Wehrmacht's ability to 
envision and implement this new style of warfare shocked militaries who had never seen or 
prepared for it.  Like a high-powered offense that can set the tone of an American football game, 
the Wehrmacht's successful invasion of France set the standard for victory throughout the war.  
From 1940 on, the war was characterized by mass of force, Combined Arms Theory, aggressive 
thrusts at the point of contention, and mass encirclements of troops.  As Citino states, the rest of 
the war can be viewed as efforts by the Allied forces to combine their own principles with 
German “lighting war” to create a new synthesis.44  In this next chapter, I will further build off 
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the United States desire to learn from Blitzkrieg, and what this looked like in practice during the 




 CHAPTER 2. THE GREAT STRUGGLE  
Mechanized and Mobile Warfare During World War Two 
The rapid successes of the Wehrmacht’s military campaigns during 1940 and 1941 
defined the standard in how the rest of the war was fought.  The days of long grinding wars of 
stagnation and attrition were replaced with the need for mobility, speed, breakthroughs, and mass 
encirclements of enemy forces.  In the last chapter, I demonstrated how the Blitzkrieg was not a 
new innovative style of war, but rather a return to nineteenth century German military doctrine 
integrated with new technologies like the tank, airplane, and radio.  What the Wehrmacht lacked 
in quality and quantity, they made up for with a modern approach to warfare that Allied forces 
had never seen or prepared for.  German tank commanders, such as Heinz Guderian, took this a 
step further by using principles laid out in Truppenführung by seizing the initiative and driving 
his panzers further into France.  Despite orders from his superior officers, Guderian took 
advantage of the disorganized French response, pressed on without infantry support, and 
effectively cut off the French and British forces concentrated in Northern France and Belgium.  
The rapid success of the assault completely broke French morale. On May 15, 1940, The French 
prime minister, Paul Reynaud, telephoned Winston Churchill to inform him that the French were 
defeated.45 
In this chapter I will show how the shocking success of Blitzkrieg impacted American 
military doctrine during the war.  I will start with the United States and other Allied nations 
commitment to modernize and motorize their fighting forces, while also seeking the formula for 
a quick decisive victory.  Though Allied armies like the United States and the Red Army became 
better equipped for mobile warfare than their German adversaries, they never achieved the 
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operational superiority that the Wehrmacht demonstrated in 1940 and 1941.  After establishing 
how the United States military adapted to fight during the Second World War, I will show how 
they sought to learn from the Wehrmacht after the war and into the Cold War era.  Using a 
collection of 213 former Wehrmacht officer’s reports from the war consolidated by the United 
States Army Historical Division, I will demonstrate the potential lessons the Wehrmacht and 
their Blitzkrieg principles offered.  As the situation with the Soviet Union deteriorated and all out 
warfare became likely, these lessons became crucial to American military doctrine.  Though 
another large scale mobilized war never materialized, the United States military continued to 
show an interest in learning from the Wehrmacht's actions during the war.  I will prove this by 
examining studies and interrogations conducted by American officers.  Along the way, I will 
continue to integrate the historiographical conversations regarding the Wehrmacht's influence on 
the United States military. 
The shocking success of the German Blitzkrieg was immediately recognized by Allied 
leaders.  British prime minister Winston Churchill and field marshal Bernard Montgomery both 
expressed their respect for the high quality of German military leadership and training.  Churchill 
openly acknowledged that the British forces lacked the quality to face the Wehrmacht in an open 
engagement on land. After the disaster at Dunkirk, Montgomery stated to a subordinate that 
“within a month or two you are going to meet in battle a German lieutenant colonel who for the 
last thirty years has given all his time every day in every week in every month to learning his job, 
and you will not be able to take him on.”46  In order to win this new modern war, the Allies 
needed a new approach.  Elliot Cohen’s article, “War Planning,” identifies three problems that 
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the Allied forces needed to address.  First was the integration of new military technology, 
particularly air power and tank formations.  The second was joint operations, or in other words, 
the way in which two or more services engaged in close and equal cooperation.  Finally, was the 
problem of supreme command and the relationship between military planners and civilian 
leadership.47  As demonstrated in the first chapter, the Wehrmacht solved these issues in the 
interwar and early phases of the war.  The creation of elite panzer divisions separated from the 
regular army, along with radio technologies used for cooperation between the Wehrmacht and 
Luftwaffe, overcame Cohen’s first two issues.  Adolf Hitler as the supreme commander of all 
German military forces also largely eliminated internal pushback from the Armed Forces High 
Command (OKW.)  
  The Wehrmacht perhaps prepared more accordingly for modern war in the interwar 
period, while on the flip side, the United States and other Allied nations were forced to rapidly 
adapt to the situation.  Though the United States recognized the potential of air power in future 
wars, at the start of World War Two they lacked a clear path forward how they would use it.  By 
1941, the United States still lacked a separate branch of the military for its air forces.48  While 
the United States was an industrial giant and the first motorized society in the world, they never 
achieved the rapid success of mobile warfare that the Wehrmacht demonstrated in 1940 and 
1941.  Rather than utilizing the potential of mobile warfare, the United States military instead 
opted to apply mass of military firepower against the enemy’s main battlefield force, and 
discouraged commanders from conducting risky offensive maneuvers.49  Perhaps the American 
military did not fully embrace all the principles of Blitzkrieg during the war, but they did commit 
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to making their armed forces the most modern and mobilized in the entire world.  Richard Overy 
points out that rather than committing to a small elite armored core like the Wehrmacht, the 
United States opted to create an entirely mechanized and motorized army.  In 1944 they 
outproduced German truck production with almost 600,000 trucks compared to the Germans 
88,000.50          
Not only did the American military commit to an entirely mechanized and mobilized 
army, their strategic approach to applying mass of firepower also integrated Combined Arms 
Theory.  Perhaps one of the most striking examples of this was the destruction of the Panzer Lehr 
Division on July 25, 1944.  At the height of the struggle for Normandy, American Thunderbolt 
fighter-bombers and Flying Fortress bombers dropped over 3,000 tons of bombs upon the 
already battle fatigued panzer division.  The results were catastrophic and instrumental to the 
Allies success in Normandy, as almost half of the Panzer division was lost in the barrage, the 
next day Allied armor swept aside the remnants of the elite Wehrmacht force.51  In many ways 
the destruction of the Panzer Lehr division at Normandy, resembled the daring Luftwaffe attacks 
during the invasion of France and Operation Barbarossa.  Using mass of firepower at a key point 
of contention, the American air forces effectively destroyed a renowned German Panzer division.  
The remaining soldiers of the division were shell shocked and disorganized like the French were 
in 1940, as communication lines were severed during the attack.  The air corps' devastating 
attack in coordination with infantry and armor paved essentially paved the way for victory during 
the Normandy campaign.          
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 The shocking display of firepower by the American’s during the Normandy campaign 
was arguably influenced by Combined Arms Theory principles displayed by the Wehrmacht in 
1940 and 1941.  One striking example of the American military integrating modern technology 
like the airplane into Combined Arms Theory is the army air corps strategic development during 
the war.  From 1940 on under General Hap Arnold, the army air corps developed a multi-purpose 
air force intended to conduct strategic bombing, large-scale transport, air defense, and tactical air 
support.  Richard Overy acknowledges this is his book Why The Allies Won, citing the 
widespread understanding that aircraft was the key ingredient of the German success.  In 
American Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s own words, “Air power has decided the fate of 
nations; Germany with her powerful air armadas has vanquished one foe after another.”52  
Statements by American leaders like Henry Stimson indicate the Allied recognition of the 
success of Blitzkrieg.  As the war dragged on, the United States and other Allied nations 
attempted to mimic the Wehrmacht's military achievements in more ways than one.     
Another key technological aspect of Combined Arms Theory that the Americans 
embraced regarding Blitzkrieg’s success was the radio.  By 1941, American air forces began 
experimenting with a system for close-support tactics for ground forces.  The key to this 
approach was similar to the Wehrmacht's close support with the Luftwaffe.  By achieving air 
superiority, American air forces hoped to achieve an adjunct to mechanized ground forces to 
help push ground forces forward.  Richard Overy indicates that initially this had mixed results, as 
the Americans did not have the means for Army commanders to communicate with air force 
commanders like the German’s did.  During the North Africa campaign in 1941 and 1942, the 
Allied system of communication between ground and air forces proved disastrous.  Army unit 
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requests for air support took so long to arrive that requesting it at all became almost pointless.  
After the conclusion of the North African campaign, the Americans decided to revamp their 
communication systems.  As a result, the Americans created a new central air command that 
worked in tandem with army commanders.  The mission of this new approach was to neutralize 
enemy air power first, attack supply and troop movements, and attack critical points on the 
battlefield.53  These functions resemble the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe’s relationship during the 
early phases of the war and again emphasize the Americans desire to emulate Blitzkrieg.  
Another important development to touch on for this project is the Red Army’s struggle 
with the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front.  The rapid early success of Operation Barbarossa in 
1941 almost completely wiped-out Soviet tank and air forces.  The numerical advantage that the 
Soviets had over the Wehrmacht was overcome by the shocking success of Blitzkrieg.  With the 
country on the brink of collapse, the Soviets were forced to overhaul their approach to warfare.54 
Like the Americans, the Soviets opted to adopt principles that resembled Blitzkrieg.  New Soviet 
mechanized forces combined two tank corps with a rifle division to create tank armies.  These 
tank armies operated in similar fashion to the Wehrmacht's Panzer cores, combining tanks, 
infantry and supporting arms.  The Soviets were able to out produce the Germans in terms of 
tank production, and by 1943 they were almost three times larger than the German forces.55  The 
tank armies also adopted of a key tenant of the success of Blitzkrieg, as they were designed to 
punch hard at the weak points of the enemy, create penetration of enemy lines, and then finally 
exploit armored breakouts with sweeping pincer movements.  At the battles of Stalingrad and 
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Kursk, the Soviets displayed these principles with sweeping success.56  One could argue that in 
some ways, the Soviets emulated Blitzkrieg in a more successful fashion than the Americans. 
Soviet military command, like the Americans, also recognized the crucial integration of 
air power into this new mechanized approach to warfare.  The Soviet’s understanding of German 
success in the war runs parallel with American ideas, acknowledging the necessity of air power 
with close coordination with ground forces.  As a result, they also adopted a Luftwaffe style 
approach of concentrating air power at the critical point of attack, in contrast with their decision 
to spread forces out across the vast Eastern front in 1941.57   Following the standard set by 
coordination between the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, the Soviets also placed their air forces 
under a centralized command structure.  Under the leadership of general Alexander Novikov, the 
Soviet air forces organized themselves after the Luftwaffe‘s air fleets, consolidating bombers, 
fighters and ground attack planes into a single attack force.  Once assigned to critical points on 
the front, these air armies came under direct command of local commanders in order to achieve 
close collaboration with ground forces.58  The development of Soviet air and tank armies 
modeled after the Wehrmacht's smaller elite mobile forces shows that, like the Americans, the 
Soviet's recognized and desired to emulate the Blitzkrieg’s success.            
Allied military victories on the Eastern front at Stalingrad and Kursk in 1943 and in 
Normandy in 1944 demonstrated that the Allies embraced select principles of Blitzkrieg and 
applied them on the battlefield.  The American and Soviet commitment to build modern mobile 
forces, apply mass of firepower at the point of contention, and integrate technology like the 
airplane and radio to Combined Arms Theory, resembles the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg in the early 
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stages of the war.  Despite all this, the Allies still never achieved a swift and decisive victory to 
secure the end of the war like the Germans did in France in 1940. The Soviets perhaps came the 
closet with Operation Bagration in summer 1944, but were still unable to deliver the knockout 
blow.  After the triumph in Normandy in the summer of 1944 and despite German forces in 
complete disarray, the war dragged on for almost another year.  Arguably, this was because the 
Allies, particularly the Anglo-American coalition, did not fully grasp the principles the 
Wehrmacht displayed throughout the war.  As stated, earlier American commanders were not 
encouraged to take risky maneuvers that were part of the formula for Blitzkrieg.  Historians like 
Robert Citino have even argued that the Americans did not achieve operational superiority 
compared to the Wehrmacht and the Red Army.59 
Citino supports his assertion of poor operational planning and coordination by the Anglo-
American coalition during the Sicily campaign and the Omaha beach landings.  The invasion of 
Sicily, Operation Husky, was a disaster from the start.  Airborne troops who were dropped in the 
dead of night were scattered around the island, with many drowning after falling into the sea.  
The overall Allied commander for the operation, Sir William Harold Alexander, put American 
forces under Patton in a mere support role as British Field Marshall Montgomery’s forces were 
tasked with slugging it out with the main German force.  Montgomery took a cautious and 
systematic approach in an operation that required dashing and speed, and after four weeks he was 
only halfway to his objective of the Sicilian town of Messina.  The slow movement of 
Montgomery’s forces and the unnecessary drive of Patton’s forces around the island allowed the 
bulk of the German forces to retreat to the Italian peninsula.60  Though the Allies were 
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eventually successful in securing Sicily, their operational planning and Montgomery's failure to 
seize the initiative squandered any chance of the Allies obtaining a decisive battlefield victory 
against the Germans.     
  Citino also cites the Operation Overlord landings as an example of poor interservice 
cooperation by the American forces.  Operation Overlord was one of the most ambitious military 
campaigns of all time, simultaneously attacking five beach fronts at once and using airborne 
troops behind enemy lines, the Allies intended to open an entire second front on Hitler‘s western 
flank.  Most of the landings went over smoothly, but at Omaha beach the 1st and 29th infantry 
divisions were pinned down by an entire division of German infantry.  Due to the planners of the 
Omaha landings decision to attack at low tide, and their reliance exclusively on air support, the 
1st army division was left exposed on the open killing grounds of the beach. Despite the odds 
stacked against them, the American forces gathered their courage and pushed inland.  Though it 
was a significant victory, it came at a high cost, as over two thousand Americans were lost.61 
While the Allies did commit to integrating new technologies like the airplane and tank into 
Combined Arms Theory, they were not able to obtain a swift decisive victory in Normandy.  
Citino points out that the Normandy campaign proved to be a drawn-out slug fest.  At the French 
city of Caen, British forces under Field Marshall Montgomery became bogged down for almost 
two months.  Though the Allied forces eventually broke through the German defenses around 
Caen and trapped remaining German forces in the Falaise pocket, it came with a high price of 
human life.  The Falaise pocket operation was largely an operational mishap as well.  Poor 
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interservice cooperation between American and British-Canadian forces led to a failure to 
complete the encirclement, and large numbers of Germans escaped.62 
Even after the Allied breakout in Normandy, the war with the Germans dragged on until 
the Spring of 1945.  The Allies successfully integrated modern technologies like the tank, plane, 
and radio into Combined Arms Theory, but never achieved the operational superiority that the 
Germans displayed in France in 1940.  Anglo-American commanders seemed to lack any sort of 
conception or idea of how to pull off an envelopment of enemy troops. Instead, they opted to 
simply drive the Germans back toward the German border rather than seeking to trap and destroy 
them in France.  The Germans even displayed flashes of their success with Blitzkrieg in the final 
years of the war, repelling the Allies offensive during the Market Garden campaign in September 
1944, and surprising them with their counter offensive in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge 
in 1944-1945. Eventually Nazi Germany collapsed under the sheer might of the Anglo-American 
forces in the west and the Soviets in the east.  Even as the war ended, however, American 
military leaders recognized there was still much to learn from the Wehrmacht.  Over the next 
fifty years, military leaders and historians alike returned to the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg attacks to 
draw lessons from the Second World War. 
The American postwar desire to continue to learn from the Wehrmacht is perhaps best 
indicated by the United States Army Historical Division’s collection of German officers' reports 
from 1945 to 1961.  The reports are vast and comprehensive, made up of over twenty-four 
volumes and covering subjects from OKW command structure, tank warfare, and various 
Wehrmacht campaigns including France and Russia.  Initially, the historians assigned to this 
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project sought to analyze the Wehrmacht's understanding of the war between the Anglo-
American coalition on the Western front.  They not only wanted to understand planning and 
execution of operations, but also give a fuller account of German defense, casualties, and 
hundreds of other details regarding the Wehrmacht's operations.63  As the postwar political 
situation with the Soviet Union deteriorated, and another global war seemed likely, the project 
shifted its focus to German operations against the Soviet Union.  Volume fifteen, for example, is 
entirely dedicated to analyzing operations on the Eastern front.  The lessons learned from these 
studies were rigorously studied by military minds and historians alike and had a direct impact on 
the development of American military doctrine during the Cold War.   
Historians who have examined the reports tend to agree that the likelihood of a war with 
the Soviets led to an American desire to learn from the Wehrmacht's experiences in Russia.  
Robert Hutchinson’s article, “The Weight of History: Wehrmacht Officers, the U.S. Army 
Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1954-1946,” acknowledges the situation with the 
Soviets as a driving factor for the study.64  Hutchinson indicates that German officers were 
willing to share this information with their former adversaries, as many of them still viewed the 
Soviet‘s and Communism as an ideological enemy.  The drawback from this was that many of 
the reports were littered with National Socialist themes of racism and anti-Bolshevism while also 
canonizing the myth of a “clean” Wehrmacht.65  Despite this bias, American military officials 
viewed these experiences as invaluable in crafting a war winning strategy against the Soviets.66  
James Wood’s article, “Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History 
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Program, 1945-1961,” also acknowledges the situation with the Soviets as a driving factor of the 
program.  Wood cites the Berlin Blockade crisis in 1948-49 as a key turning point in the 
emphasis of the program to focus on the Wehrmacht's experiences against the Soviets.  As a 
result, historical narratives of the war in the West were largely replaced by “how to” manuals on 
fighting the Red Army.67    
Although the criticisms by Hutchinson and Wood regarding the National Socialist bias 
within the reports are warranted, lessons of Blitzkrieg are also evident throughout the reports.  
Volumes four through six focus heavily on OKW command structure and consist largely of 
German officer’s critiques of Hitler’s meddling as a supreme commander and the German’s 
commitment to mobilized warfare.  General Walter Warlimont’s report on the German high 
command describes Hitler’s role in diminishing the authority of the Wehrmacht high command 
while also forcing onto to them the “irrevocable decision” to attack Poland, Norway, France, and 
Russia.  Statements like these and other German generals must be met with skepticism.  Only 
one of the German officers recruited was a trained historian and their biases against Bolshevism 
and the Soviets impacted the reports. General Halder also specifically requested that the officers 
write their reports in a way that blamed the Wehrmacht shortcomings on the dead Hitler, and not 
the alive officers.68  Warlimont went on to explain how the commitment to “lighting war” after 
1941 hurt the OKW’s command structure even further.69  Warlimont’s statements were not the 
only example of German commitment to mobile warfare.  Lieutenant General Gustav Hoehne’s 
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report, “Fast mobile and armored forces,” also emphasized the OKW‘s commitment to creating a 
mobilized force.  Hoehne explained in detail the German conceptions of this mobilized force and 
how it developed during the interwar period.  This force not only required that the motor vehicle 
become an integral part of the army, but also called for new, fresh conceptions of leadership.70 
Hoehne’s report was significant to American military doctrine in that in provided details 
on how Blitzkrieg worked on an operational level.  The report described the role of these mobile 
forces in delivering decisive strikes, making speedy use of their success, and relying on modern 
equipment, first-class training, and hand-picked personnel to win battles.  Hoehne also embraced 
the role of the airplane in the future of warfare, and explained that for mobile warfare to work, 
close cooperation with the air force was absolutely required.71  The emphasis on first-class 
training and quick instincts of commanding officers was a key lesson of Blitzkrieg gained from 
reading the German military studies.  Hoehne explained the necessity of leaders in mobile units 
to not only become masters of their equipment, but also educated in tactical situations.  
Commanders were required to have sufficient experience in actual war service, tactical 
comprehension of the situation, and a capacity for delivering positive and reliable results at the 
point of contention.72 For the Wehrmacht, it was not just the commitment to mobile warfare that 
ensured Blitzkrieg's success, but also the ability of its officers to seize the initiative during battle. 
Volume seven of the World War Two German Military Studies consisted of the OKW 
war diaries, and provided feedback on multiple Wehrmacht campaigns including Poland, France, 
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and Operation Barbarossa.  These reports were significant for the development of the American 
understanding of Blitzkrieg, as they provided direct feedback into the German perspective of the 
reasons for their swift decisive victories.  German general Helmuth Greiner reflected on the 
campaigns in the report, starting with the birth of Blitzkrieg during the Polish campaign in 
September 1939.  Greiner indicated the uncertainty of the operation among various German 
generals, but Hitler’s determination to make war with Poland marked an important test for the 
Wehrmacht.  Speed was the essential factor in defeating the Polish forces.  Two separate attack 
wedges were to drive to the Vistula and the Narew rivers, while commanders were required to 
adjust themselves to new situations and Polish forces were to be knocked out immediately.  This 
speedy armored thrust was supplemented with overwhelming support from the Luftwaffe 
designed to break the nerve of the Poles.73 The operation was carried out as planned, the only 
surprise was the unbelievably short amount of time of the operations success in nineteen days.  
Greiner reflects that the Wehrmacht had passed their test, and as a result, Hitler felt they were up 
to the task of any order he intended to give.74         
Greiner also provided a detailed report of the background and execution of Fall Gelb 
(Case Yellow), the 1940 invasion of France.  Like the Polish campaign, leaders of the OKW 
were skeptical of the implications of the campaign.  Greiner emphasized Hitler’s direct oversight 
of the planning, and once again the supreme commander was demanding a quick decisive 
campaign.  Hitler was confident in the superiority of the German forces, particularly the 
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Luftwaffe.75  Like Poland, the operation unfolded with surprising success and speed.  As German 
forces crashed into Belgium, the best of the French and British forces moved north to face them.  
The trap was set just as German strategists presumed.  Armored forces under Heinz Guderian 
unexpectedly burst through the Ardennes Forest in a massed concentrated effort.  Supplemented 
by Luftwaffe air support, Guderian caught the French totally disorganized and took advantage of 
the situation by driving to the English Channel.  Greiner once again stressed how the swift 
victory filled the Germans with enthusiasm and satisfaction.  The German victory was possible 
by the concentrated thrusts of armored and motorized forces, along with flexible leaderships and 
excellent support by the Luftwaffe.  Consequently, the success played into Hitler‘s own ego and 
gave the German people the idea that Hitler was a great military commander.76  The ultimate test 
for the German Blitzkrieg had yet to come, as Hitler‘s next great gamble meant an invasion of 
the vast Soviet Union. 
Operation Barbarossa was arguably one of the most ambitious military campaigns of all 
time.  While the Wehrmacht knocked out the French and Polish armies in quick fashion, the 
Soviet Union had far more ground to cover and a quantitative advantage in manpower and 
industry.  Once again, Hitler called for a swift and decisive campaign, and believed the campaign 
would take no longer than four months.77  Greiner contended that by this point the Army High 
Command were immersed in the success of Blitzkrieg and were convinced a swift victory was 
possible.  Looking back, Greiner recognized that the Germans underestimated various obstacles, 
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including the enormous size of Russian territory, traffic and climate conditions, and the 
endurance and toughness of the Russian population.78  Despite these obstacles, Operation 
Barbarossa had stunning initial success.  Using three concentrated thrusts in the north, center, 
and south of the Soviet Union, the Germans once again caught their opponents completely off 
guard.  The Luftwaffe was crucial to initial success, wiping out almost two thousand Soviet 
planes in the first hours of the invasion.79  The rapid advance into the Soviet Union, however, 
perhaps exposed the weaknesses of Blitzkrieg warfare.  Driving hundreds of miles into Soviet 
territory stretched German supply lines, and as Soviet resistance hardened, German casualties 
piled up.  As Army Group Center under Heinz Guderian became bogged down at Smolensk, 
Hitler made a fateful decision to divert armor to the south to speed up the invasion of Ukraine.  
While this move contributed to the fall of Kiev, it bought the Soviets valuable time as heavy 
rains bogged down the rapid advance of German forces.80     
As the Russian winter set in during December 1941, it froze not only the ground, but also 
the German Blitzkrieg.  The Germans, overconfident after their initial success were not prepared 
for the conditions of winter warfare.  With priority given to fuel and ammunition, troops lacked 
winter supplies, leading many to freeze to death.81  Too make matters worse, the Soviets 
launched a surprise counterattack on the Germans threatening the outskirts of Moscow in the 
early morning of December 5, 1941.82  The counterattack under the command of general G.K. 
Zhukov was a display of the Soviet‘s newfound understanding of Blitzkrieg warfare.  Using 
concentrated mobile attacks, the Soviets attacked the Germans across the front and poured 
                                                          
78 Ibid., 125-126. 
79 Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 63. 
80 Ibid., 64-65. 
81 Ibid., 66-67. 
82 Ibid., 67. 
38 
 
armored units into gaps created by the infantry assault.  Through the month of December, 
Wehrmacht forces were pushed back and both forces were pushed to the point of exhaustion.  
Despite advice from his top military advisors, Hitler issued his famous “stand-fast-order“ and 
commanded German soldiers to hold their positions to the death.83  Hitler‘s orders perhaps 
signified that the war in the East was determined to be a drawn-out bitter war.  Despite the 
failure of the German Blitzkrieg, the pace for the rest of the war with the Soviets was defined by 
its principles.  Across the vast expanse of the Soviet Union, battles were defined by rapid armor 
movements at points of contention, Combined Arms Theory, and mass encirclements of troops. 
While reports gathered by the U.S. Army Historical Division on the invasions of France, 
Poland, and Russia provided insight to the initial success of Blitzkrieg, volume fifteen of the 
studies was entirely devoted to understanding the Eastern Theater.  The emphasis on analyzing 
the details of the German actions in the east are an important indication of the Americans desire 
to learn from Blitzkrieg.  As war with the Soviet Union appeared inevitable, it was crucial for the 
Americans to gain any sort of advantage over their next potential opponent.  Volume fifteen of 
the German Military Studies includes a complete analysis of the Blitzkrieg campaigns and the 
lessons the Americans could learn from them. In an analysis of the Polish campaign written by 
United States Army Major Robert Kennedy, the officer sums up several of the key learning 
points of the Blitzkrieg campaign.  Most notable are Kennedy’s assertions that the German war 
of movement had ended the era of static warfare marked by World War One.84  Other lessons 
that Major Kennedy recognized were the efficacy of the German organization of concentrated 
armor and air units, the training of Wehrmacht soldiers to act with aggressive action, and in the 
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interservice cooperation of the Luftwaffe with ground forces.85  American military studies such 
as Major Kennedys indicate a clear desire to learn from the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg, a trend 
that would continue throughout the Cold War. 
Volume fifteen also includes a manuscript of an interrogation of German general Franz 
Halder.  The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Cosse Brissac, who recognized 
Halder as one of the masters of the German military art.86  Brissac‘s interview went in depth on 
the strategic aims of Barbarossa, like the previously mentioned reports, Halder indicated the 
desire to strike fast, destroy enemy forces in encirclement battles, and maintain aerial superiority 
of Russian airspace.87  Like many German generals reflecting on the operational developments 
on the Eastern front, Halder too criticized Hitler’s meddling in strategic affairs.  One of the major 
critiques was Hitler’s decision to transfer four panzer divisions from Army Group South.  This 
left Halder concerned for the northern and southern flanks of German forces fighting for 
Stalingrad, a concern that came to fruition in November 1942.  Despite Halder’s warnings to 
Hitler, the General was relieved of his post on September 24, 1942 and was never recalled back 
to active duty for the remainder of the war.88  The interviews of German commanders like Franz 
Halder not only shaped the American understanding of the conflict with the Soviets, but also 
gave them crucial insight into the successes and failures of the German Blitzkrieg.   
American military studies like Robert Kennedys and interrogations like Cosse Brissac’s 
indicated a clear desire on the part of the Americans to learn from the success of Blitzkrieg 
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campaigns.  While the Army Historical Divisions studies and interviews of the Wehrmacht 
perhaps played into the myths of a clean Wehrmacht, the lessons learned provided valuable 
operational lessons that shaped how the Americans could win an all-out war with the Soviet 
Union in Europe.89  While the American military embraced the integration of armor and planes 
into Combined Arms Theory, they still did not fully grasp the principles that made the early 
German Blitzkrieg successful.  Arguably, the Soviet Union grasped these principles better than 
the Americans and British.  In the World War Two German Military Studies collection, German 
commanders articulated the need to strike decisively at key points of contention, emphasize the 
use of speed, and allow officers to act with intuition and aggression in their maneuvers.  These 
principles slowly would work their way into American military doctrine over the course of the 
Cold War, and eventually led to the creation of Airland Battle Doctrine during the 1980s.  In the 
next chapter I will discuss the continued desire of the Americans to learn from Blitzkrieg, and 
how these lessons were implemented over the course of the Cold War.                                                                       
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 CHAPTER 3. TRIAL, ERROR, AND SUCCESS 
Evolution of American Military Doctrine during the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm 
American military thinkers and historians alike continued to revisit lessons from the 
Wehrmacht as the Cold War unfolded over the next forty years.  The United States Army 
Historical Division continued their interviews and research of former German officers until 
1961, and their conclusions left a clear impact on American Military Doctrine.90    I will 
demonstrate in how many ways, the United States military sought to emulate the Wehrmacht 
throughout Cold War conflicts and throughout the 1990s.  There are several ways in which this 
effort is undeniable.  The first I will examine is the continued studies of the Army Historical 
Division. Volume seventeen in particular exclusively features insights on the war in Russia, with 
topics ranging from defensive improvisations against Red Army offensives to protecting logistic 
networks over the vast space of the theater of war.  Next, I will examine how the American 
military fought during Cold War conflicts of containment.  While the Americans did not achieve 
decisive victory during these conflicts, they still drew lessons from the Wehrmacht and 
attempted to achieve maneuver warfare.  After the conclusion of theses indecisive conflicts, The 
American military redesigned itself to create a more professional highly trained force that 
emphasized maneuver warfare and interservice cooperation.    
  Finally, I will examine the development of the Air-Land Battle doctrine in the 1980s.  
This doctrine was put into practice via Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and Air-Land Battle is 
recognized as the conceptual basis of its success.91  By comparing Air-Land Battle principles 
with those in Truppenführung, I will show how the Americans desired to emulate the success of 
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the Wehrmacht's early Blitzkrieg campaigns.  These campaigns are characterized by lightning-
fast mobile strikes, inter-service coordination, intuitive leadership, and swift decisive results with 
minimal loss of life.  During the Gulf War, the United States and their allies achieved all these 
principles, beating Saddam Hussein’s regime in roughly one hundred days.  In more ways than 
one Operation Desert Storm resembles the success of early Blitzkrieg campaigns, particularly the 
1940 invasion of France.  The NATO coalition struck with lighting speed and aggressiveness, 
concentrating an armored thrust at a heavily fortified opponent across seemingly impassable 
terrain.  They also displayed effective interservice cooperation, complimenting a concentrated 
armor attack with a massive air offensive that crippled the enemy’s supply and communication 
networks.92  Like the Germans in France during the Fall Gelb campaign, the Americans executed 
a daring offensive using an integration of the latest technology to decisively defeat the enemy. 
In the years following World War II, the United States military anticipated that a large-
scale conflict in Central Europe with the Soviet Union was inevitable.  This is a trend that 
continued throughout the entirety of the Cold War and influenced the evolution of American 
military doctrine heavily.  Seeking to gain any sort of advantage against the Red Army, U.S. 
military leaders saw the study of the strengths and weaknesses of Russian infantry as a 
necessity.93  The best available source to draw from was the former Wehrmacht officers working 
with the Army Historical Division.  Even though the Wehrmacht lost to the Red Army, 
American military thinkers still saw the Germans information as invaluable.  Most likely, this is 
due to the similar strategic situations the United States would find themselves in if a large-scale 
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war in Europe erupted. Robert Hutchinson acknowledges that by 1949 the U.S. Army began to 
see its strategic position as similar to the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front in 1943.94  In the event 
of a Soviet invasion of western Europe, the Americans assumed they would be fighting a 
defensive battle against an opponent that heavily outmanned and outgunned them on the 
continent.  As a result, volume seventeen of the U.S. Army Historical Division’s Wehrmacht 
studies shifted from understanding the success of Blitzkrieg warfare, to analyzing the details of 
defensive warfare against the Soviets. 
By highlighting a few significant studies within volume seventeen, it is apparent the 
Army Historical Division sought to gain some insight on fighting a defensive war against the 
Red Army.  A study published in 1951 by the Department of the Army supports this premise. 
The contribution, “Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign,” consists of an 
analysis by an anonymous former Wehrmacht general and focuses heavily on events from 1943-
1945, specifically the German retreat from the Eastern Front into the northern plains of 
Germany.95  Chapter two of the study specifically focuses on defensive measures employed by 
the Wehrmacht in the event of Russian offensives.  These measures included tactical retreats by 
German soldiers in the face of imminent attacks, and reforming in the rear into stronger and 
more reinforced lines to face the enemy.  The retreating Germans also employed demolitions 
along their route of retreat to cause disruption to the advancing Red Army.96  Another point of 
interest in German defensive measures is the employment of fortress cities.  By 1944, 
Wehrmacht commanders were ordered to use towns and cities as makeshift fortresses by digging 
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defensive lines and creating anti-tank positions.  Soldiers were ordered to hold the towns at all 
costs, and the approach often ended in the encirclement of German forces.  The former 
Wehrmacht commander was critical of this approach, however, arguing that preserving forces to 
fight another day was more important that defending strategically insignificant towns.97 
Another noteworthy study that shows the desire to learn from Wehrmacht defensive 
tactics is report NO. 20-234, “Operations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences in Russia.”  
Published in January 1952, the report discusses tactical and logistical problems facing the 
operations of encircled German forces.  This knowledge was gained as a result of German 
fortress cities and resulted in a trend of desperate last stands by German forces during the later 
years of the war.  The report also emphasizes the role of the Luftwaffe in these scenarios by 
keeping encircled troops supplied, a goal that was rarely achieved.  The Wehrmacht commander 
evaluates several scenarios where German forces were encircled and attempts to draw lessons 
from various breakthrough operations.98  While the Wehrmacht failed in many of these battles of 
encirclements, the American military still saw the lessons as invaluable in preparing to fight off a 
potential Soviet invasion. 
Perhaps the most significant study in volume seventeen, and one that indicates a direct 
connection between German and American military doctrine, is study NO. 20-233, German 
Defense Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs.  The 1951 study again draws from a nameless 
former Wehrmacht officer who fought in the battles Kharkov and Belgorad.99  The officer 
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provides a detailed analysis of the German method of “Active Defense“ a relatively simple but 
effective approach that employs counterattacks in response to Soviet offensives.  The purpose of 
Active Defense is to cut off forward advances of Red Army forces by launching a counterattack.  
In order to do this, reserve forces are required to close the breach of Russian attacks. These 
forces must be removed from the frontlines to ensure their maneuverability and must strike with 
tremendous force and concentrated mass of firepower.  Attempts must also be made to narrow 
the breach by tactically withdrawing to a shorter line and reinforcing resistance adjacent to the 
gap.100  The description of the Wehrmacht‘s active defense method left a direct impact on 
American military doctrine during the Cold War.  In 1976, the U.S. Army adopted FM 100-5 
Extended Battle, also known as active defense, as their official doctrine. I will cover the doctrine 
in more detail later on, but the similarities to the German active defense methods are clear. At its 
core, the doctrine calls for high mobility of reserve air and ground forces to quickly meet 
attacking forces, using maneuver to concentrate forces at the right time and place.101      
Though studies from volume seventeen of the German military studies suggested the 
United States were preparing for an all-out defensive war in Europe, the seemingly inevitable 
never came.  Instead, the Cold War evolved into a nuclear arms race and a series of smaller scale 
wars of “containment.” As it became increasingly clear that the Soviets were committed to the 
global spread of communism, the United States opted to prop up both democratic and non-
democratic anti-communist governments around the world. Nations that were jointly occupied by 
Soviet and American forces, like Germany and Korea, became hotspots for Cold War 
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tensions.102 While the Americans surely thought the European front would explode at any 
moment, Korea was actually the opening act of the containment wars of the larger Cold War.  
While Korea is often referred to as a “forgotten war” it constituted an important transition and 
lesson for the American military. In many ways the war was a bridgehead between the 
conventional military doctrine of fighting decisive battles of World War Two and the United 
States’ post-war commitment to conducting limited wars of containment. The opening phases of 
the war featured highly mobile operations by the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), United 
Nations forces, and the Chinese People’s Volunteers, while the second half of the war devolved 
into a static positional struggle of attrition.103 
 The Korean War was a particular challenge for American military leaders, mainly for its 
nature as a limited conflict. This conflict was limited in several ways: limited geographically to 
the Korean Peninsula, limited in the number of resources committed to the conflict, and limited 
too by public opinion concerning the conflict from around the world.104  The war was also 
unique in that it was the first time U.S. Army units served America and a broader United Nations 
effort, a reoccurring theme that has emerged in American military incursions.105  Initially 
American military leaders stuck to their World War II approach of mass of firepower and 
destruction of the enemy's main force.  This approach, however, was not effective in the limited 
nature of the Korean War. From the outset, most of the Army’s divisions had major equipment 
shortages and personnel barely reached 70 percent of their full strength.  Coupled with a war 
weary American public, a constrained budget, and congressionally imposed personnel strength 
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ceilings, the American military entered the Korean peninsula unprepared for the conflict.  As a 
result, the army sustained significant casualties during the initial phases of the war during the 
summer of 1950.106 
Despite its nature as limited war, there still seems to be indication that certain American 
military commanders sought to fight an aggressive style conflict that in some ways emulated 
Blitzkrieg. Douglass MacArthur's Inchon counterattack is perhaps the best example.  After a 
series of victories by the NKPA, the Americans and their South Korean Allies were pushed back 
to the south eastern corner of the peninsula.  Like the Wehrmacht during operation Barbarossa, 
the NKPA’s rapid offensive success stretched their supply lines to their limits, making them 
vulnerable to American airpower. MacArthur, recognizing the NKPA’s vulnerability and 
utilizing American air superiority cooked up a plan to catch the North Koreans off guard and 
retake Seoul. Using an amphibious assault that resembled Wehrmacht pincer movements during 
World War Two, American marines would swing around the Korean Peninsula and crash into 
the North Korean flank at Inchon.107  The plan was as daring as it was risky, but in the end 
MacArthur’s assessment of the situation and decision to strike decisively caught the North 
Koreans off guard.  As with the German invasion of France in 1940, which confronted the 
British with the choice of evacuating the continent or face destruction, the very success of the 
American movement put the North Koreans in a similar dilemma: stay in the south and be cut off 
and destroyed, or retreat hastily back up the peninsula. 
Even with Seoul and South Korea liberated as a result of the Inchon landings, the war on 
the Korean Peninsula was far from over.  MacArthur planned to invade North Korea and crush 
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the communist regime for good.  Ignoring intelligence reports that Chinese soldiers were now 
deployed in North Korea, MacArthur pushed his forces further into North Korea. At the battle of 
the Chongchon river in late November 1950, outnumbered American forces were met by two full 
Chinese armies of light infantry.  Despite American technological superiority, the speed and 
mobility of these light infantry units broke through decisive points along the front.  The result 
was the longest retreat in U.S. military history, before American forces eventually stabilized the 
front roughly along the preexisting border.108  The remainder of the war was largely fought over 
the 38th Parallel, characterized by static positional warfare that contrasted the opening phases of 
the war. Despite the war ending in a relatively inconclusive stalemate, the footprint of the 
Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg was apparent throughout the duration of the conflict.  The Inchon 
landings indicated U.S. military leader's commitment, when and where feasible, to interservice 
cooperation and aggressive flanking maneuvers.  However, a growing rivalry between the 
American Army and Airforce perhaps limited the full potential of Combined Arms Theory.  This 
rivalry is indicated by postwar Army studies that criticized the Air Force‘s failure to prevent the 
enemy from deploying and maintaining large and effective land forces.  Not surprisingly, since it 
was prepared by the Army, the study ultimately concluded the United States was unprepared to 
defeat the Communist threat due to its reliance on the Air Force and Navy.109 
MacArthur’s Inchon campaign is not the only evidence of the Wehrmacht's influence on 
the conduct of the Korean War.  The Army Historical Division collected over 900 reports from 
Wehrmacht officers over the course of the Korean War.  German doctrinal concepts such as 
mobile defense were translated and delivered to every army unit down to the battalion level.  
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American Field Service manual FM-100-5 illustrated the American respect for the opinions of 
German officers.  Numerous revisions were suggested in FM-100-5 including the combined arms 
integration and mobile defense, principles that were implemented by the U.S. Army in 1954.110 
Wehrmacht officers also provided information and formed conceptions of how the Americans 
were to fight irregular guerilla warfare.  One brief specific example of this can be found in 
volume seventeen.  Study No. 20-240, “Rear Area Security In Russia: The Soviet Second Front 
Behind German Lines,” covers in detail the struggle between the Wehrmacht and irregular 
Russian partisans far behind the front lines of the Eastern Front.  The German officer writing the 
report put heavy emphasis the threat of partisans to supply lines, the need to have effective forces 
in the rear to combat partisans, patrols and checkpoints along key roads and highways, and the 
ruthlessness of mopping up partisan infected areas.111  Based on the Wehrmacht's experience 
fighting partisans along the Eastern Front, the U.S. Army Historical divisions collected dozens of 
reports on guerilla warfare from former officers.  By 1949 it had produced and distributed some 
twenty-one monographs regarding German experiences with partisan warfare in the East.  The 
Army Historical Division also translated the Wehrmacht's 1944 field manual, “Fighting the 
Guerilla Bands.”  Hutchinson points out that while these reports had a direct impact on the 1951 
U.S. Army publication FM-31-20 “Operations Against Guerrilla Forces,” they relied heavily on 
German myths and biases against the Soviets.112 
Despite the impact of Wehrmacht officer reports that influenced the American military 
during the Korean War, the United States never achieved a decisive victory resembling the 
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Wehrmacht’s early Blitzkrieg campaigns.  Even though the Americans and their South Korean 
Allies did not lose the war, the bloody stalemate left a bad taste in the mouths of U.S. military 
commanders. The phrase “No more Koreas!” became a sort of slogan in the years following the 
war.113 On the operational level, the technologically superior American forces were outplayed by 
light Chinese infantry who struck decisively and overwhelmingly at key points of contention.  
Without overwhelming firepower from United Nations artillery and airpower, the U.S. forces 
faced being completely routed.  Robert Citino contends that perhaps the key takeaway from the 
Korean War, was the importance of well trained and effective infantry.114  The emphasis of 
highly trained and professional infantry is a key aspect of the Wehrmacht’s success during World 
War II,  inflicting a 3-to-2 casualty ratio throughout most of the war.  This disparity was largely 
the result of German stress on Auftragstaktik, or mission-oriented tactics.  This mission-oriented 
approach gave senior officers considerable freedom to act on their own initiative to achieve a 
mission‘s goal, rather than following detailed specific orders.115  That, of course, assumes well-
trained junior officers and infantry who understand both the intent and limitations of an order, 
and have the intrinsic motivation to carry them out.  As a war with the Soviet Union appeared 
almost inevitable during the 1950s and 1960s, the United States could not afford more 
operational mishaps like what occurred during the Korean war. 
While the stakes remained high between the United States and the Soviet Union into the 
1960s and 1970s, an all-out conventional war between the superpowers never occurred. Instead, 
the United States found itself in another limited war of containment in Southeast Asia. Much like 
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the Korean War the United States entered Vietnam to stop the spread of Communism. Vietnam 
was also an operational challenge for the U.S. military, as President Johnson’s commitment to 
defend South Vietnam was contradicted by the initially limited deployment of manpower and 
resources into the conflict.116 The nature of warfare in Vietnam also proved a daunting challenge 
for U.S. Army doctrine. By now, the American army was built to fight immense battles, 
presumably against the Soviet Union, supported by Combined Arms firepower from fleets of 
tanks and aircraft. In Vietnam they found themselves fighting guerillas that required light 
infantry to patrol the dense jungles of Vietnam with the only reliable fire support being 
mortars.117 As a result, the war played out as a grinding war of attrition that eventually ended 
with the United States pulling out of the country in 1973. The jungle terrain of the country and 
the guerilla fighting style of the Viet Cong leveled the playing field against the technologically 
superior American forces. 
The Vietnam war is largely remembered as a disaster for the U.S. military. U.S. Army 
Colonel David Hackworth recalls, “I felt we sent an army to Vietnam that was not prepared to 
fight the war. I felt that we did not understand the nature of the war in the military.”118  Geoffrey 
Sloan also points out that on top of operational blunders of the military, the trauma of Vietnam 
created a crisis of confidence between the military, the public, congress, and the executive 
branch.119  While there were indisputable shortcomings during the war, there were also some 
critical operational developments.  One major technological breakthrough was the utilization of 
helicopter-borne assault forces. Designed to go anywhere and hit any objective without having to 
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secure flanks, helicopter assaults became crucial to offensive maneuvers.120  One striking 
example of the offensive potential of helicopter assaults is Operation Pegasus during March of 
1968.  As U.S. Marines were trapped fighting in the city of Khe Sanh, the United States launched 
a daring offensive to breakthrough to the marines.  Using Combined Arms Theory principles, the 
1st Calvary Division launched airmobile assaults via helicopter supplemented by rockets, 
artillery, and aircraft.  The operation had stunning success as American forces secured the 
perimeter around Khe Sanh and reopened supply lines to the city in record time with low 
amounts of casualties.121  The successful employment of helicopter-borne assaults to relieve the 
encircled marines at Khe Sanh was strikingly similar to the Wehrmacht's encirclement operations 
studied by the Army Historical Division.  Relief of encircled troops via air support proved to be 
much more successful with the integration of the helicopter. 
1973 was the year of a crucial crossroads in American military doctrine.  The stalemate 
ending of Korea and the defeat in Vietnam resulted in the U.S. military seeking reforms. Almost 
immediately after the ceasefire between the Americans and the North Vietnamese in January 
1973, the U.S. military established the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).  Initially 
under the command of General William De Puy, the most pressing matter addressed was how the 
United States could apply its tremendous modern firepower on the battlefield to its own 
advantage.122  The same year the United States ended its conscription program, instead opting to 
build an all-volunteer military force that was professionally trained.123  The development of a 
smaller volunteer based and professionally trained military force is comparable to the small 
highly trained force General von Seeckt developed in Germany during the 1920s.  However, this 
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is not the only evidence of a fighting force influence by the Wehrmacht.  Even though Du Puy 
was one of the leading U.S. commanders during the Vietnam war, he drew on his experiences  as 
an officer in the European theater during World War Two. Du Puy was largely struck by the 
unrealistic training of U.S. Army soldiers that left them unprepared for the battlefield in 
comparison with the tactical excellence of the German Army.124   
   The influence of the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg is clear on Du Puy and TRADOC. The 
result of their discussions recognized the importance of operational-level warfare. No longer did 
U.S. military planners cling to the idea that overwhelming force and firepower could grind down 
the enemy as they had in pervious wars, they now recognized that there was an art to handling 
the echelons above division.125  The recognition of war as an art is perhaps a tip of the hat to the 
Wehrmacht's Truppenführung doctrine during World War Two, with its first bullet point 
describing war as an art, depending on free creative activity.126  Du Puy also drew on the success 
of the Israeli army during the “Six Day War” war in June 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 
1973. In both cases Israeli forces were outnumbered against an invading coalition force led by 
Egypt and Syria. During the “Six Day War” in 1967 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a 
surprise attack against Egyptian and Syrian forces. Like the Luftwaffe during the early Blitzkrieg 
campaigns of France and Operation Barbarossa, the Israeli air forces completely wrecked the 
Arab coalition's air forces within a few hours. At Sinai, an IDF armored assault crashed into 
advancing Egyptian forces from the front and flanks supported by overwhelming firepower from 
aircraft, the result was a disastrous rout of Egyptian forces.127  The Yom Kippur War also 
impressed Du Puy as once again the IDF displayed a masterful display of modern Combined 
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Arms Theory and achieved results with limited casualties.  Historians Geoffrey Sloan, Andrew 
Gallo, and Robert Citino recognize that the timing of these conflicts was crucial to U.S. doctrine 
in the 1970s and 1980s, as the IDF‘s strategic position of being outmanned and out gunned 
resembled what a Soviet invasion of Central Europe might look like.128 
Under Dupuy’s leadership, the U.S. army underwent significant doctrinal changes.  In 
1976, the FM 100-5 Extended Battle, or “active defense” doctrine fundamentally changed the 
Americans tactical doctrine of static defense. Active defense instead called on U.S. commanders 
to move their units and rapidly apply force at key points on the battlefield.  The design of this 
tactical doctrine intended to give U.S. army forces a mobile defense capable of winning a battle 
against numerically superior Warsaw Pact troops.129  Du Puy and other TRADOC leaders 
believed the defensive approach of the active-defense doctrine gave the Americans the ability to 
fight outnumbered and win.130  The employment of Active-Defense doctrine indicates a direct 
connection with the German Active-Defense doctrine on the Eastern Front during the second half 
of the war.  It also perhaps indicates the recognition by U.S. military commanders of the similar 
strategic positions of the NATO allies in central Europe and the Wehrmacht during World War 
Two.  The U.S. Department of Defense figures from the 1980s support this claim. NATO was 
outnumbered in almost every category: 42,500 to 13,000 in main battle tanks, 31,500 to 10,750 
in artillery and mortars, 78,800 to 8,100 antitank weapons, and finally 7,240 to 2,795 tactical 
aircraft.131 
 Despite the significant developments gained by Du Puy’s leadership, TRADOC did not 
stop their revisions to American military doctrine with the Active Defense doctrine.  TRADOC 
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continued their brainstorming into the 1980s, when several military thinkers found problem with 
the Active Defense doctrine.  One major issue identified in the Active Defense Doctrine was that 
for it to work, it depended on the enemy achieving a breakthrough at one point in the defensive 
line in order for a concentrated counterattack to be launched against the enemy forces. It also 
over emphasized the priority of winning the first battle, an approach that could cause the army to 
ignore responses to situations that might be fundamentally different.132  As a result, a new 
doctrine was developed in 1982, AirLand Battle.  The name emphasizes the primary purpose of 
the doctrine, an integration of the three-dimensional nature of modern battle, infantry, armor, and 
air warfare.133  An important aspect of this doctrine was the integration of newer technology in 
American military doctrine.  Like the Germans during the interwar period, the Americans desired 
to use new warfighting technology in innovative fashion to gain an advantage over their enemies.  
Andrew Gallo identifies a “big-five” of these technologies, being the Abrams main battle tank, 
the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Apache attack helicopter, the Black Hawk utility helicopter, and 
the Patriot air defense system.134 
While there is no direct mention of Blitzkrieg within AirLand Battle’s official 
publication, the similarities are obvious.  The primary functions of the doctrine indicate a shift 
from traditional American doctrine, with a shift to a focus on operational focus involving the 
rapid movement of man and materials.135  AirLand Battle in many ways resembles the principles 
laid out in the Wehrmacht's Truppenführung manual that were vital to the early German success 
in World War II. In the field manual describing the fundamentals of army operations, American 
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officers are encouraged to take initiative, use agility and maneuverability, study historical 
examples, and rely on close coordination with airpower for support.  The manual also references 
missions-based tactics encouraging officers to act independently within the framework of the 
higher commander‘s intent.136  The identical language used in AirLand Battle’s doctrine and the 
references to missions-based tactics are clear evidence of the United States desire to emulate the 
success of Wehrmacht's early Blitzkrieg campaigns. The reasoning behind this dramatic change 
in doctrine was the Americans recognition of the similar strategic situation to the Wehrmacht in 
Central Europe and their admiration for Blitzkrieg's early success. 
Some historians have generally agreed that AirLand Battle was an attempt to recreate and 
embody the success of the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg campaigns.  A thesis written by James Curry, 
a masters student at the University of Western Australia, in 2015 examines how the United States 
attempted to emulate Blitzkrieg with the development of Airland Battle. Curry describes how in 
many ways, Airland Battle was a major break from traditional US military doctrine that relied on 
numerical superiority, firepower, and brute force.137  A “Wehrmacht mystique” existed within 
the U.S. army during the late Cold War, one in which the German army of World War Two was 
viewed not only as a highly effective fighting force, but one worthy of emulating through 
American military doctrine.138  Curry provides further evidence of this ”Wehrmacht mystique” 
within the U.S. military by citing the numerous articles written in the 1970s and 1980s in the 
U.S. military‘s official journal, Military Review. There were dozens of articles written relating to 
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the Wehrmacht from 1965 to 1995 and no less than sixteen were published that were devoted to 
the Wehrmacht and its doctrine after the publication of Airland Battle in 1982.139   
Curry’s analysis of  the “Wehrmacht mystique” and his review of Military Review 
articles are not the only evidence of the American desire to emulate Blitzkrieg.  Further evidence 
of the American admiration includes studies conducted by American military officers 
themselves.  In 1991, United States Marine Corps officer, Major Marvin Knorr, wrote a thesis 
analyzing the development of German doctrine from 1832-1945 and its application of supporting 
arms. Major Knorr’s tone towards the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg is overwhelmingly positive, 
citing the operational superiority of the Germans during the French campaign.140  Knorr 
concludes that while the Wehrmacht eventually broke down against the sheer might of the Allies, 
the Germans displayed admirable operational success throughout the war.  He attributes the 
German Army’s effectiveness to the following: its style of command and control and its 
offensive spirt, its experience during the interwar period, its training and leadership, the 
cohesiveness between branches aided by communication, and the initiative that was built into its 
officer corps.141  Major Knorr’s conclusions are a clear example of how American officers 
admired the operational superiority of the Wehrmacht. Citing the invasion of France as the peak 
of operational success during the war, we can see the admiration for Blitzkrieg tactics. 
Luke O’Brien’s article, “The Doctrine of Military Change: How The US Army Evolves,” 
acknowledges the role of incubators within TRADOC (United States Army Training and 
Doctrine Command) and how they impacted the development of Air-Land Battle. Incubators are 
smaller subunits that exist outside of military bureaucracy, giving them the freedom to examine 
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future trends and problems and devise possible solutions. These incubators create networks that 
provide intellectual forms for military leaders, and provide a platform for debate, critiques, and 
improvements for military doctrine.142  An example of one of these forums is the analysis of the 
Wehrmacht in the Military Review articles mentioned by Curry.  During the 1980s, these 
incubators relentlessly focused on developing a doctrine capable of countering the Soviets in the 
event of a European ground war.  O‘Brien also reinforces the point that American incubators 
desired to adopt a Blitzkrieg like doctrine, using Combined Arms Theory, maneuverability, and 
mass of firepower at decisive points.  O‘Brien also demonstrates the role these incubators played 
in the further development of Air-Land Battle.  Citing the further studies conducted at Fort 
Leavenworth.  These studies and their conclusions were then printed in publications such as 
Infantry or Armor magazine.143  In 1981, some of these theories were put into practice with the 
opening of the National Training Center (NTC) in Ft. Irwin California.  Designed to give U.S. 
forces the opportunity to prepare for the Soviet threat, the camp came with an opposition force 
composed of armored Calvary built to resemble the Soviet army.144 
Though the United States and NATO prepared relentlessly for an all-out war with the 
Soviet Union in Europe, the colossal struggle never materialized. By 1991, the Soviet Union 
essentially collapsed from within, marking an end to the decades long Cold War. The United 
States had prepared for over forty years for a confrontation in Europe, and in the meantime had 
adopted Blitzkrieg like tactics with the development of the AirLand Battle doctrine. Though the 
collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of one of the most bitter rivalries in modern history, 
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it did not ensure a lasting peace. Instead, the United States found itself intervening against the 
Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein following his August 1990 decision to invade Kuwait. The 
conflict gave the United States military a chance to use AirLand Battle in an actual conflict 
instead of wargames. As a result, Operation Desert Storm unfolded as a modern-day Blitzkrieg 
campaign, with the United States achieving one of its most successful military campaigns in 
history. In the next few paragraphs, I will demonstrate how the United States operational success 
against Iraq embodied Blitzkrieg and led to a decisive victory resembling the Wehrmacht's 
invasion of France in 1940.   
Historians largely agree that Operation Desert Storm contained all the elements of a 
successful modern Blitzkrieg. Historian Omer Bartov declared that the American victory over 
Saddam’s forces contained all the elements of a 1991-style Blitzkrieg citing the minimal 
casualties, quick results, and massive destruction of the enemy that was achieved.145  James 
Curry also agrees that the success of Operation Desert Storm is comparable to the 1940 invasion 
of France, citing the U.S. Army’s implementation of Air-Land Battle as a display of “lightning 
war”146 Robert Citino also alludes to Operation Desert Storm as a modern Blitzkrieg, and even 
declares the operation as the most successful in U.S. military history.147  United States military 
commanders also praised the success of Operation Desert Storm and alluded to the influence of 
Blitzkrieg.  United States Air Force General Merrill McPeak praised the execution of Combined 
Arms Theory, declaring “This was the first war in history in which air power was used to defeat 
ground forces.”148  These conclusions from a range of historians and military minds alike 
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provide a solid foundation of how the American military executed a modern-day Blitzkrieg in 
1991.   
The origins of the Gulf war follow much the same pattern as Hitler’s decision to 
aggressively expand in Europe. After decades of fighting Iran, the Ba’ath regime led by Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq was on the brink of economic collapse. With the nationalistic regime now facing 
growing opposition in their own country, Saddam made the decision to invade his small neighbor 
to the southeast, Kuwait. Much of this decision stemmed from longstanding land disputes and 
Saddam’s desire to secure oil.149  Saddam’s regime was in a peculiar position geopolitically. 
Remaining neutral throughout the Cold War and positioned in the strategic theater of the Middle 
East, Iraq spent much of the latter stages of the Cold War era battling with its neighbor Iran. 
Believing that the United States would not intervene directly, and that the Soviet Union was too 
weak to respond, Saddam thought he could take Kuwait unopposed. Using his veteran 
Republican Guard, Saddam’s forces crossed the Iraq Kuwait border on August 2, 1991.  The 
initial force consisted of two armored divisions supported by Special Forces using heliborne 
landings to secure the roads leading up to Kuwait City.  On the second day three more Iraqi 
armored divisions poured into the country and the outnumbered Kuwait military was quickly 
overrun.  With Saudi oilfields now within striking distance of Saddam’s forces, the United States 
was called upon to intervene.150 
The crisis in the Middle East was a unique challenge for the United States military.  Since 
the Vietnam war, the United States had largely avoided any direct and committed military 
interventions.  Though they had developed the doctrine of AirLand Battle in the 1980s, they had 
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not demonstrated any of its principles in a live war.  The potential conflict with Iraq was also 
significant as it gave the United States an opportunity to fight against a Soviet style military. 
E.R. Horton and Tom Copper’s analysis of the Gulf war, Desert Storm: The Iraqi Invasion of 
Kuwait and Operation Desert Shield 1991, shows how the Iraqi army was armed with 
predominantly Soviet weapons. This included over 1,000 T-72 tanks, around 200 BMPs, 35 
152MM 2SW Akatsiya self-propelled artillery, and Mig 25 and SU-20 fighter jets.151  The calls 
for assistance by Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations also meant the United States had a 
massive logistical problem should they decide to intervene. American military presence in the 
Middle East was relatively small at this time.  However, with the Cold War winding down, the 
United States and its NATO allies found the flexibility needed to move forces from Central 
Europe into the Middle East.152 
The decision to intervene military against Saddam’s regime by President Bush and other 
NATO leaders led to a major logistical undertaking, an area that was lacking for the Wehrmacht 
during World War Two. The initial goal of the U.S. forces was to protect Saudi Arabian interests 
and build up a massive military force in the region, hence the name Operation Desert Shield. 
U.S. Air Force squadrons begin arriving within the first thirty hours of the orders to deploy, and 
by the end of October 1991, over 500,000 personnel and roughly 3.7 million tons of supplies 
were moved into the region.  While the buildup of forces unfolded, Revolutionary Guard forces 
began fortifying their positions in Kuwait.  On the flip side, American theater commander 
General Norman Schwarzkopf began drawing battleplans.  The United States intended to fight a 
battle of maneuver warfare that in more ways than one resembled the 1940 invasion of France.153 
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The battleplan called for deception and maneuverability that would catch the Iraqi forces off 
guard.  The overall goal of the operation was not just to push back Saddam’s forces, but 
absolutely annihilate them using encirclement maneuvers supported by close coordination with 
the air force.154 
  Like the German invasion of France, the plan was largely reliant on deception of the 
Iraqi forces.  The American forces wanted Saddam to believe the main attack was coming at his 
fortified positions on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, while in reality the main attack was to come  
against a more lightly defended position to the West of the heavily fortified Iraqi lines.  These 
positions were more lightly defended due to the “Southern Desert,“ an area of land that Iraqi 
military commanders assumed the U.S. forces would not dare cross. Much the same as the 
Germans utilized the Ardennes forest, the Americans surprised their foes by doing the 
unthinkable.155  General Schwarzkopf referred to the maneuver as a “Hail Mary” play. While 
U.S. and other coalition forces in the center kept the fortified Revolutionary Guard forces in 
place, an armored thrust crossed the Southern Desert, quickly overrunning the lightly fortified 
positions to the West. Once they had broken through, they crashed into the right flank of the 
Revolutionary Guard forces completely by surprise.156  Like the Germans during the 1940 
French campaign, the Americans decision to attack at an unsuspecting point on the battlefield 
and their outflanking of heavily fortified Iraqi positions worked with shocking success. 
The display of maneuver warfare and deception were not the only display examples of a 
modern Blitzkrieg. The United States military also demonstrated a superb integration of 
Combined Arms Theory via helicopters and airplanes. While the main armored thrust crashed 
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into the Iraqi forces, U.S. military forces using heliborne attacks established forward bases all 
along Highway 8, the main road leading back into Iraq from Kuwait.  The American air force 
also played a crucial role similar to how the Luftwaffe acted in the invasion of France.  The 
beginning role of the air force can be broke down into three steps: First, the destruction of 
strategic positions in Iraq, second was suppression of Iraqi air defense systems, finally was came 
the coordination of close ground support with U.S. forces in Kuwait.157  The results were 
devastating just as the Luftwaffe’s was during the invasion of France and Operation Barbarossa. 
Almost immediately, the U.S. air force's hindered the Iraq‘s ability to conduct war by knocking 
out key strategic bases such as the National Air Defense Center in Baghdad. American planes 
also destroyed Iraqi planes on the ground and within a week had essentially wiped out the 
Saddam‘s air force.  With Iraqi air defenses and warplanes effectively destroyed, NATO air 
forces now turned their attention to the destruction of Iraqi ground forces.158  The success of the 
NATO forces was operational air war, a term coined by the Luftwaffe in 1925, carried out to 
perfection.159 
Like the French during the opening phases of Fall Gelb, the Iraqi forces found themselves 
in total disarray. The stunning success and speed of the operation shocked even American 
military planners, as the campaign lasted only one hundred hours.  By gaining superiority of the 
air and out maneuvering the Revolutionary Guards, U.S. forces annihilated the encircled Iraqi 
forces.160  The climax of the battle came on February 26, as Iraqi forces retreated from Kuwait 
City. Along the Basra Highway leading out of the city, columns of defenseless Iraqi tanks, troop 
transports, and other vehicles were annihilated by U.S. air power.  The spectacle of the 
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dominance of airpower was rightfully named the “Highway of Death,“ as thousands of Iraqi 
soldiers perished in the onslaught.161  After decades of trial and error, the United States had 
finally achieved a decisive victory in one bold operation.  As the Germans in 1940 had 
succeeded in rendering France’s Maginot Line useless with maneuverability, the United States 
had done the same by crossing the Southern Desert and bypassing the Iraqi fortified positions. 
Using helicopter assaults and devastating airstrikes, the United States completely disorientated 
the Iraqi forces and with close coordination with ground forces, completely destroyed a heavily 
armed military force. 
  In conclusion, this chapter shows the evolution of American military doctrine 
throughout the Cold War and into Operation Desert Storm.  This evolution was heavily 
influenced by the German success at Blitzkrieg during the early phases of World War Two.  The 
United States military’s desire to learn from and emulate Blitzkrieg is supported by evidence 
such as the U.S. Army Historical Divisions studies, studies conducted by American military 
officers such as Major Knorr and General Du Puy, and the scores of articles written in Military 
Review during the 1970s and 1980s.  While these desires stemmed from an admiration of the 
operational success of the Wehrmacht, I have also shown how the context of the Cold War 
influenced the evolution.  Believing that a war with the Soviets was inevitable and recognizing 
the similar strategic position to the Wehrmacht in World War Two, the United States opted to 
emulate Blitzkrieg.  Instead of an all-out war with the Soviets, the United States instead fought 
limited wars of containment on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam.  The fruitless ending to 
these conflicts brought United States military leaders back to the drawing board.  Under the 
leadership of General Du Puy and the TRADOC, the United States developed the doctrine of 
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Air-Land Battle in the 1980s.  As shown in this chapter, Air-Land Battle was almost identical to 
the Wehrmacht's Truppenführung doctrine used during World War Two. During the Gulf war in 
1991, these Blitzkrieg maneuver warfare principles were used to achieve a decisive victory with 
minimal casualties.  The success of Operation Desert Storm led to a breakthrough in U.S. 
military thinking, decisive victory is obtainable by a war of movement on the operational 
level.162 
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION 
This project argues that World War II and Cold War doctrine was heavily influenced by 
the early success of the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg, particularly the invasion of France and the 
opening phases of Operation Barbarossa.  Looking at specific developments from the 1940s all 
the way through the 1990s, there is significant evidence the United States military desired to 
emulate a successful Blitzkrieg style campaign.  During World War II, the United States 
committed its industrial might to create a predominantly motorized fighting force.  The U.S. 
Army Historical Division conducted interviews and studies of former Wehrmacht officers from 
1945-1961, focusing heavily on the Blitzkrieg campaigns in Poland, France and particularly 
Russia.  The development of Air-land Battle in the 1980s was essentially an English translated 
version of the German Truppenführung.  These examples show how the 20th century American 
military was heavily influenced by a foreign power and a former enemy in the Germans. 
The trend of foreign concepts of war influencing American military doctrine is not 
isolated to World War II.  During World War I, American military doctrine was heavily 
influenced by their French allies.  The French emphasized doctrine of systematic approach of 
finding, pinning, and destroying the enemy with overwhelming firepower.  Robert Citino argues 
that during the last year of the war in 1918, the United States successfully employed this strategy 
against the war weary Imperial German forces.  During the Interwar period the United States 
officially adopted this approach with the 1923 F.S.R (Field Service Regulation) essentially being 
a translated version of the French manual of 1921.  This doctrine remained in place in the United 
States through the early phases of World War II.163  Despite the Allied victory over Nazi 
Germany, the French style of attrition warfare with massive firepower as proven obsolete in 
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comparison to German’s maneuver style Blitzkrieg campaigns.  The 1940 invasion of France 
resulted in a swift German victory that shocked the world, and arguably changed the nature of 
warfare forever.    
In the first chapter I discussed the origins of the Blitzkrieg campaign and showed how the 
Germans developed a doctrine of mobile warfare during the interwar period.  In reality, there 
was nothing significantly innovative about the concept of Blitzkrieg doctrine, and its success was 
highly exaggerated by both the Allies and the Germans.  In fact, the term Blitzkrieg is absent 
from any official German military doctrine.  Rather than developing an entirely new concept of 
warfare, interwar German military leaders, such as Hans von Seeckt and Heinz Guderian, 
integrated modern technology into the traditional nineteenth century approach of maneuver 
warfare.  This approach emphasized maneuverability, intuitive leadership, application of force at 
key points of contention, and mass encirclements of enemy forces to achieve a decisive victory.  
The nature of static warfare and development of new technologies such as the tank, airplane, and 
machine guns created setbacks for maneuver warfare, as militaries on both sides struggled with 
how to integrate these developments.  The German forces also recognized the issue of 
information overload and growing scope of armies and operations leading to indecisiveness on 
the front lines.164 
During the interwar period, General von Seeckt addressed these issues and formed the 
basis for what would become known as Blitzkrieg.  Seeking to create a small professional 
fighting force capable of winning short decisive victories, the interwar German army developed 
Truppenführung.  While there are no direct references to Blitzkrieg within the doctrine, the 
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principles laid out are those associated with the success of lightning war.  Principles laid out  
within Truppenführung combined with modern Combined Arms Theory were the formula for 
success during the Wehrmacht’s early Blitzkrieg campaigns.  During the 1939 invasion of 
Poland, the 1940 invasion of France, and the initial invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the 
shocking speed and success of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe set the pace for the rest of the war.  
The other major warring nations, chiefly the United States and the Soviet Union, knew the path 
to victory lied in committing to mobilized warfare and integrated Combined Arms Theory.  
While the United States successfully out produced the Germans in tanks and airplanes, they did 
not achieve the operational success that the Germans obtained in the early phases of the war. 
Almost immediately after the conclusion of World War II, another war, this one between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, appeared inevitable.  Seeking to gain any sort of 
advantage over their potential adversaries, the Americans quickly employed former Wehrmacht 
officers in an analytical capacity.  By examining the studies of the Wehrmacht conducted by the 
United States Army Historical Division, we can see the emphasis on learning from the 
Wehrmacht’s early Blitzkrieg campaigns successes.  As the Cold War intensified throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, the American military leaders recognized the similarities between their 
strategic position in Central and Western Europe and the Germans on the Eastern Front from 
1943-1944.  This premise is demonstrated by the shift in focus of the Army Historical Divisions 
studies in volume seventeen, which focuses heavily on the German execution of defensive 
warfare against the Soviets.  Concepts such as counter attacking armored offensives, breaking 
through envelopments, and coordination with air forces all had an impact on the American’s and 
NATO’s course of action in the event of an all-out war in Europe.      
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Instead of a traditional war breaking out in Central and Western Europe, the Cold War 
instead evolved into smaller limited wars of containment.  In Korea and Vietnam, the 
technologically superior United States’ armed forces were largely ineffective against enemy 
forces that relied heavily on light infantry and insurgent tactics.  The results of both wars left the 
American military seeking major reforms.  Under General William Dupuy the American military 
began to shift away from their traditional approach of mass of firepower against the enemy.  
Citing the effectiveness of the Wehrmacht during World War Two and drawing from the lessons 
of “Active Defense” in volume seventeen of the German military studies, Dupuy and 
TRACDOC created the doctrine of “Extended Battle” designed to counter a Warsaw pack 
armored offensive in Europe.  The doctrine also emphasized the importance of Combined Arms 
theory, and integrated new technologies like the helicopter and fighter jets into the doctrine.  
Another crucial development in the post-Vietnam era was the shift to create a more highly 
trained professional infantry forces, comparable to the Wehrmacht's development in the inter-war 
era. 
  Eventually, Extended Battle doctrine evolved into AirLand battle during the 1980s.  
While there is no direct reference to the Wehrmacht or Blitzkrieg within the doctrine, the 
connections are clear.  AirLand Battle called for interservice cooperation between ground and 
land forces and heavily emphasized maneuverability.  Officers were also encouraged to use a 
mission-based tactics approach, emphasizing soldiers to know the objective of the operation and 
to use instincts and creativity to achieve its goals.  By examining AirLand Battle, the connections 
to the Wehrmacht's Truppenführung are obvious.  American military planners anticipated 
AirLand Battle would be implemented against the Soviets in the event of an all-out war in 
Europe.  At the National Training Center (NTC) in Ft. Irwin California, the American military 
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prepared rigorously for a war with the Soviets using war game scenarios.  AirLand Battle is not 
the only indication of an admiration of the Wehrmacht by American military planners.  
Numerous articles written in Military Review during the 1980s and studies such as that by Major 
Marvin Knorr also show the fascination with the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg tactics.  At the center 
of this fascination was the anticipated war with the Soviet Union. 
The war that the United States prepared for from 1946-1990 never came to pass.  The 
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and the threat of war become unlikely under new Soviet 
leadership.  Instead, the next war the United States found itself in was with Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait.  Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was perhaps the climax 
of the decades of trial and error the United States experienced during the Cold War.  The United 
States and their NATO allies executed an almost flawless offensive operation against the heavily 
entrenched Iraqi forces.  Using aggressive maneuverability and seamless interservice cooperation 
between ground and air forces, the American coalition achieved in destroying the fighting ability 
with their enemy with rapid results and minimal loss of life.  Operation Desert Storm was 
executed in just under one hundred days, almost mimicking the success of the Wehrmacht’s 
early Blitzkrieg campaigns during World War II.  After decades of searching for the formula for 
decisive battlefield victory, the United States finally achieved their own modern Blitzkrieg 
campaign.   
Perhaps today, the United States military is at a crossroads once again.  After the 
September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the United States made another 
incursion into the Middle East, a conflict that is still on going to this day.  The insurgent style 
warfare and complex battlefield of the current situation has left the United States in a bit of a 
quagmire in the region, one that seems never ending at the moment. At the same time, the 
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growing power of China and a resurgent Russia also offer challenges.  The rise of the digital age 
and the overflow of information perhaps has created the same problems that German military 
planners recognized during the World War I era.  What is clear and what this project argues is 
that the American military was heavily influenced by the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg over the 
course of the Cold War era.  After decades of trial and error, the United States finally grasped 
operational superiority by employing Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg.  With the execution of 
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